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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     Terry Shiring, formerly employed as a mail carrier by the 
United States Postal Service, appeals from the decision of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, granting summary judgment for the Postal Service on 
Shiring's claim of discrimination in violation of the federal 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Shiring, whose medical problems made 
it impossible for him to continue at his job of postal carrier, 
contends that the Postal Service was obligated to find a new job 
for him that he was capable of performing within his physical 
limitations.  Because Shiring made no showing that such a 
position exists, or that he properly applied for transfer, we 
will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Postal 
Service. 
 
                                I. 
     In 1984, the United States Postal Service hired Shiring as 
a part-time flexible (PTF) letter carrier.  This position meant 
that Shiring was not guaranteed a regular route or a full forty- 
hour work week.  The position is entry level, with the least 
amount of seniority of all postal employees.  At Shiring's 
request, the Postal Service transferred him several times to 
different locations, employing him as a PTF carrier in each 
location.  In 1987, Shiring was reassigned to the Oakmont, 
Pennsylvania Post Office. 
     In early 1990, Shiring began to experience severe foot pain 
when delivering the mail along his routes.  In May of that year, 
he sought treatment from Dr. Lewis Stein.  Dr. Stein diagnosed 
Shiring's condition as hallux rigidas limites and a possible 
sesemold bone fracture of his right foot.  Stein fitted Shiring 
for protective orthopedic devices and informed him that he was 
restricted from excessive walking before the devices arrived.  
Shiring notified the Postal Service, which placed him on light 
duty work.  The Postal Service assigned Shiring to "casing" mail, 
which meant sorting the mail before delivery.  Normally, each 
letter carrier is responsible for casing the mail for his or her 
own route; however, during the period Shiring was on light duty, 
the Post Office had him case the mail for all eight carrier 
routes. 
     Also during this time, Shiring filed a claim with the 
Office of Workers' Compensation.  He received compensation for 
the work-time he missed due to his disability. 
     After the orthopedic devices arrived, Shiring went back to 
work as a letter carrier.  However, the devices failed to ease 
his condition, and, in December of 1990, Dr. Stein diagnosed 
Shiring as permanently disabled.  Shiring was restricted from 
more than occasional walking, for a total of less than one hour 
in an eight-hour workday.  The Oakmont Post Office put him back 
on the modified light duty position it had earlier created.  
However, in January of 1993, the Post Office determined that 
there was nothing more available for him at the time consistent 
with his limitations. 
     Shiring asserts that during the time before he was 
discharged, several postal positions became available that he 
could have performed within his physical limitations.  He claims 
that the Postal Service refused to transfer him to one of these 
clerk or counterperson positions.  The only proof, however, that 
Shiring asserts to support this contention is an excerpt from his 
own deposition in which he seems to state that he was transferred 
to a light duty position at the McKnight Road office, but was 
then released from that position because it was a job which the 
union was entitled to have open for bids. 
     Shiring remained unemployed, receiving worker's 
compensation at 75% of his regular salary, from January, 1993 
until November of 1994.  At that time, the Postal Service created 
a new position for him at its office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  
On December 12, Shiring accepted the position and began to work 
again. 
     However, in April of 1994, Shiring had filed the instant 
complaint, alleging that the Postal Service discriminated against 
him in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.  
701 et. seq.  Shiring alleged that he was an otherwise qualified 
disabled individual, who was capable of performing the essential 
functions of his office with reasonable accommodations, and that 
the Postal Service had failed to make reasonable accommodations 
for him.  He further alleged that it had discharged him solely 
because of his handicap.  Because Shiring was seeking backpay and 
reinstatement of pension and seniority losses, he did not dismiss 
his complaint when he accepted his current position. 
     In March of 1995, the United States Postal Service moved 
for summary judgment.  It asserted that Shiring was unable to 
meet his burden of showing that he was an otherwise qualified 
disabled individual.  Shiring had stated at his deposition that 
he was unable to physically deliver the mail, and that no 
accommodation on the part of the Postal Service would have made 
this feat possible.  The Postal Service pointed out that mail 
delivery was an essential function of letter carriers, and that a 
disabled person must still be capable of performing the essential 
functions of a position in order to be otherwise qualified.  
Because Shiring could not, it claimed that his job was not 
protected by the Rehabilitation Act.   
     In response, Shiring argued that the 1992 amendments to the 
Act showed a Congressional intent to apply the standards of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act in determining whether the 
Rehabilitation Act had been violated.  Because the ADA defined 
"reasonable accommodation"  to include reassignment to certain 
vacant positions, Shiring asserted that the Postal Service did 
not make reasonable accommodations for his disability when it 
refused to reassign him from letter carrier to other positions 
which did not require walking. 
         The district court did not consider whether 
reassignment was a reasonable accommodation under the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Thus, it did not discuss whether any 
positions were available, or whether plaintiff had established 
that he had applied for, and was qualified for, the open 
positions.  Rather, the district court considered "reasonable 
accommodations" only as it related to plaintiff's performance in 
the specific job of letter carrier.  Finding that there were no 
accommodations the Postal Service could adopt which would enable 
plaintiff to fulfill the essential elements of his job, the 
district court determined that plaintiff was not a qualified 
individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.  
Therefore, because Shiring had not established a prima facie 
case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
United States Postal Service. 
 
                              II.   
     The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.  701 et. seq., 
is applicable only to federal employers and employers who receive 
federal funding.  Private employers must comply with the 
standards set forth in the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C.  12111 et. seq.  The Rehabilitation Act forbids 
employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities 
in matters of hiring, placement, or advancement.  At the same 
time, Congress recognizes that employers have legitimate 
interests in performing the duties of their business adequately 
and efficiently.  Employers cannot be obligated to employ persons 
who are incapable of performing the necessary duties of the job.  
Therefore, Congress has devised the following standards: 
     In order for an employee to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, the employee bears 
the burden of demonstrating (1) that he or she has a disability, 
(2) that he or she is otherwise qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodations by the employer; and (3) that he or she was 
nonetheless terminated or otherwise prevented from performing the 
job.  The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that 
reasonable accommodation is possible.  If the plaintiff is able 
to meet these burdens, the defendant then bears the burden of 
proving, as an affirmative defense, that the accommodations 
requested by the plaintiff are unreasonable, or would cause an 
undue hardship on the employer.  The court considers several 
factors in making this determination. 
     In Shiring's case, no one disputes that he is a disabled 
person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.  Likewise, 
it is undisputed that he was terminated.  The parties disagree, 
however, on whether Shiring was otherwise qualified to perform 
the essential functions of his job. 
     One of the essential functions of a mail carrier is to 
physically deliver the mail to the people along the route.  In 
his deposition, Shiring concedes that this was impossible for him 
to do.  No amount of accommodation on the part of the Postal 
Service would have made this possible.  Thus, Shiring was not 
otherwise qualified for the position of PTF letter carrier.  See29 C.F.R. 
1614.203(a)(6)(qualified individual must be able to 
perform essential functions of the position); see also McDonald 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995). 
     It is true that for a few months the Postal Service had 
Shiring casing mail for all eight routes, and doing no delivery 
at all, notwithstanding that delivery of mail is an essential 
element of the `letter carrier' position.  The `casing' position 
to which he was temporarily assigned was not an official 
position, but had been created by the Postal Service to give 
Shiring something to do on a temporary basis.  Therefore, 
Shiring's suggestion that he would have been qualified to perform 
the requirements of such a position does not help his case 
because under the Act employers are not required to create 
positions specifically for the handicapped employee.  Fedro v. 
Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1395 (7th Cir. 1994)("...the Rehabilitation 
Act has never been interpreted to require an employer to createalternative 
employment opportunities for a handicapped 
employee...").  It follows that the district court did not err in 
refusing to consider the non-existent position of `caser' as an 
accommodation that would make Shiring qualified. 
     However, the district court did not consider Shiring's 
allegations that he requested transfers and reassignments to desk 
jobs within the Postal Service, and that his employers prevented 
him from receiving these reassignments.  This was error; the 
court should have considered whether reassignments were a 
reasonable accommodation.   
     This was not always the case.  Before 1992, disabled 
individuals had to prove that they were qualified only for the 
job that they were employed to do.  "[Employers] are not required 
to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the 
job he or she is doing."  School Board of Nassau County v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289, n.19 (1987).  Although reassignment 
was an option under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, see42 U.S.C. 
 12111(9)(B)(reasonable accommodation may include 
reassignment to a vacant position), it was not required of 
federal employers under the Rehabilitation Act.  However, in 
1992, the Rehabilitation Act was amended to provide: 
     Section 794.  Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and 
     programs. 
     (d) Standards used in determining violation of section 
         The standards used to determine whether this section 
     has bee violated in a complaint alleging employment 
     discrimination under this section shall be the standards 
     applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
     Act of 1990.... 
29 U.S.C.  794(d). 
     Pursuant to this amendment, the Code of Federal Regulations 
was amended effective October 31, 1992 to provide that employers 
shall offer to reassign nonprobationary employees if those 
employees become unable to perform the essential functions of 
their jobs.  The reassignment should be to an already funded, 
vacant position within the same commuting area, and at the same 
grade or level.  29 C.F.R.  1614.203(g).  The use of the word 
"shall" indicates that this reassignment offer is mandatory, 
unless the reassignment would cause the agency undue hardship.  
Therefore, courts should consider whether reassignment is 
possible in determining whether an individual seeking relief 
under the Rehabilitation Act is an otherwise qualified 
individual. 
     However, the burden is on the employee to prove that he is 
an "otherwise qualified" individual.  Buckingham v. United 
States, 998 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1993).  When the employee 
contends that he would be otherwise qualified with reasonable 
accommodation, it falls to the employee to make at least a facial 
showing that such accommodation is possible.  Id. at 740.  In 
this case, there is nothing in the record, beyond Shiring's vague 
allegations in his deposition, that any transfers were requested.  
Shiring would have to demonstrate that there were vacant, funded 
positions whose essential duties he was capable of performing, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, and that these 
positions were at an equivalent level or position as PTF carrier.  
PTF carrier is the lowest seniority position in the Postal 
Service, and the Service is not required to promote Shiring to a 
higher level to accommodate his disability. 
                               III. 
     In summary, the district court should have considered the 
option of reassignment before determining that Shiring was not 
otherwise qualified for employment within the United States 
Postal Service.  However, its failure to do so is not cause for 
reversal, because it is harmless at most.  Shiring's assertions 
in his deposition that there were jobs he wanted to transfer to 
are insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating the presence 
of vacant, funded positions at his current level of seniority and 
pay, which he could perform.  A plaintiff seeking relief under 
the Rehabilitation Act must demonstrate what reasonable 
accommodations he or she contends the employer should have made, 
including an identification of the positions the employer should 
have considered for reassignment.  Because Shiring failed to do 
so, the trial court committed no reversible error. 
     Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Postal Service will be affirmed. 
 
                                                                                
